I.
Introduction O ne of arbitration's most attractive features is procedural flexibility, permitting parties to customize their process to best suit particular needs. This is commonly known as the "party autonomy" principle. Party autonomy means that, subject to limited exceptions, parties may, inter alia, decide which disputes are arbitrable, who will adjudicate, how the procedure will run and which outcomes or remedies the adjudicator may impose. In The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company v Unifund Assurance Company, the Ontario Court of Appeal took a step toward limiting party autonomy. It ruled that a court hearing an appeal under section 45 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 ("the Act") 1 is not bound by a term in the parties' arbitration agreement stipulating the applicable standard of review. 2 This paper argues that parties' ability to agree in their arbitration agreements on a standard of review for appeals should not be circumscribed. Although the Court of Appeal's reasoning in Dominion is correct in the administrative law context, it fails to account for salient differences arbitration law brings to bear on the analysis. This decision is one of several arbitrationrelated decisions in recent years wherein a reviewing court immediately resorted to administrative law principles without examining the legislative framework and relevant arbitration law principles.
3 Despite notable similarities, like presumptive expertise and enhanced efficiency, arbitration and administrative law comport important differences. Sometimes, as here, arbitration principles justify a departure from the administrative law method. In that regard, this paper is not meant per se as a case comment on Dominion. Rather, it aims to indicate why the particular limit the Court of Appeal placed on party autonomy in Dominion was unjustified and founded on inapplicable legal principles.
The Author wishes to note the position taken in a previous writing: the standard of review framework set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp is flawed in that it maintains correctness on constitutional questions and questions centrally important to the legal system and outside the arbitrator's expertise. 4 The thesis was that, due to fundamental differences between certain principles underlying arbitration law and administrative law (and the public legal system * James Plotkin is a commercial and intellectual property disputes lawyer with Caza Saikaley LLP based in Ottawa, Ontario . He holds an LL.L., J.D. and LL.M. from the University of Ottawa. 1 SO 1991, c 17. generally), the Court erred in preserving any of the "correctness categories" identified in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick. 5 The Court, it is argued, should have instead created a blanket reasonableness standard for all appeals on questions of law from arbitral awards subject to a narrow exception for constitutional questions when at least one party to the arbitration is a state entity subject to the Constitution. However, that text did not contemplate situations, like Dominion, where the parties expressly stipulate a standard of review in an arbitration or submission agreement. Rather, it analyzed the default standard of review framework (i.e. where the parties have not agreed in advance on the standard of review) and argued, similarly to here, that the Supreme Court placed an overreliance on administrative law principles to the detriment of applicable arbitration law principles, namely party autonomy and the private nature of arbitral justice. Consequently, the Author stands by blanket reasonableness review of arbitral awards for all the reasons originally espoused, with one proviso: presumptive reasonableness gives way if, and only if, the parties agree to appeals on the correctness standard. As discussed in section C(2)(b) below, party autonomy-the underlying basis for the general rule of curial deference in arbitration-also grounds the exception of non-deference upon agreement.
II. Parties' standard of review selection is inoperative under Ontario jurisprudence
In Dominion, the Ontario Court of Appeal weighed in on whether parties may pre-select a standard of review in the event of an appeal from an arbitral award. It decided the answer is no, relying in part on its previous decision in Intact Insurance Company v Allstate Insurance Company of Canada.
Dominion dealt with a dispute between insurers as to liability under Ontario's Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) to the Insurance Act. 6 The SABS regime provides a no-fault compensation scheme for people involved in automobile accidents in Ontario. Under the scheme, the claimant must first claim against his or her own insurer (if the claimant is uninsured, there are provisions permitting him or her to claim against another insurer). The involved insurance companies then determine, according to the order of priorities set out in the SABS regulation, which of them is liable for the coverage.
7 Insurers are to resolve priority disputes by arbitration. 8 In this instance, the insurers had included a standard of review term in their arbitration agreement. They agreed that the reviewing court would apply correctness to appeals on questions of law and reasonableness on questions of mixed fact and law.
9
In its decision, the Court of Appeal first determined it owed no deference to the Superior Court Judge's decision on the applicable standard of review.
10 It went on, however, to find itself equally unconstrained by the parties' chosen standard of review as expressed in their arbitration agreement.
11 The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Monsanto Canada Inc v Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services), holding that the standard of review, as a question of law, lies with the court.
12 The Court went on to ascertain the applicable standard in accordance with its previous case law. It referred to Intact, wherein Justice LaForme held that the administrative law framework applies to appeals from insurance arbitrations. In Intact, the Court found that the Supreme Court's decision in Sattva determined reasonableness to be the applicable standard of review.
13
For good measure, the Intact Court took on an administrative law contextual analysis to again arrive at a reasonableness standard.
14
As of this writing, Dominion has been applied once to negate parties' express standard of review selection.
15 Indeed, in Northbridge, also an insurance case, the party seeking to uphold the agreement argued that reasonableness review on legal questions hinders legal certainty and encourages "arbitrator shopping".
16 Without commenting on these arguments, the Court (rightly) felt bound by stare decisis and refused to give effect to the parties' agreement on the standard of review.
17 Although Dominion, Intact and Northbridge were insurance-related cases, nothing in the Court's reasons indicate that the holding is limited to that statutory regime, or to statutorily mandated arbitration generally. On the contrary, the Court's statement was framed broadly to encompass even purely contractual arbitration. It did not attempt to distinguish insurance arbitration from standard commercial arbitration. Although there might be some differences, the fact that the Act is applied as the procedural law in both cases makes it difficult to see how those differences could bear on whether the parties should be free to determine their standard of review in advance. 
III.
Parties should be permitted to stipulate their desired standard of review Dominion disregards the party autonomy principle, which militates in favour of permitting party agreement on the standard of review (1). In coming to the opposite conclusion, the Court mistakenly relied upon principles derived from judicial review of administrative action (2). When one properly considers arbitration theory, and discards inapplicable administrative law doctrines, the rationale for permitting parties to specify the standard or review in arbitration or submission agreements becomes clear.
A. Dominion disregards the party autonomy principle
Party autonomy, or contractual freedom, is the fundamental principle underpinning arbitration as a means of resolving disputes. At base, it is the notion that parties may devise a custom-made dispute resolution process, and that courts should not interfere, save on a tightly circumscribed set of matters.
19 In the words of one prominent author, "it is fundamental to the concept of party autonomy that the parties may craft any remedy or dispute resolution mechanism they wish."
20
This principle is present in the Act and its counterparts in New Brunswick, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, which are based on the 1990 Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC). Although the ULCC proceedings from 1989 signal the participants' view that judicial intervention might prove more acceptable in domestic arbitration as compared with international arbitration, party autonomy nevertheless pervades the Act and its counterparts.
21 This is consistent with the notion that arbitration is a "private dispute resolution The party autonomy principle is by no means limited to domestic arbitration, or Canadian arbitration for that matter. Indeed, international commercial arbitration authorities recognize party autonomy as foundational.
23 It inheres strongly in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) 24 upon which the legislation governing international commercial arbitration is based (or inspired) in all Canadian provinces and territories.
25 It is worth noting that the Act was designed to exist in harmony with Model Law-based legislation.
26
Accordingly, all international and most domestic Canadian arbitration legislation is intended to maximize the scope of what may be left to party agreement.
The Supreme Court of Canada and other courts have long since recognized party autonomy as a central tenet of arbitration and a basis for providing considerable flexibility in agreements to arbitrate.
27 However, before Dominion, the case law said little on the specific question of whether party autonomy extends to selecting a standard of review on appeal. In
Inforica Inc v CGI Information Systems and Management Consultants Inc,
Justice Chapnik hinted that parties could in fact set the standard of review in advance.
28 Relying on then applicable jurisprudence, the Court applied the correctness standard to an issue going to the tribunal's jurisdiction. In so doing, it validated the notion that parties could set a standard of review in 22 The Superior Court decision was overturned on appeal, but with no reference to the standard of review at all, let alone whether the parties could choose it.
29
Party autonomy, though critical, is not absolute. Even the Act, which permits parties to contract out of or vary nearly all its provisions, provides in section 3 (actually titled "Party Autonomy" in the Alberta statute) that certain provisions are mandatory.
30 Limits on party autonomy have been recognized in international context, such as preserving natural justice, protecting weaker parties, protecting the public good and ensuring appropriate recourse to courts.
31 That said, when asking whether the parties to an arbitration agreement may or may not agree to certain content, the point of departure should always be presumptive permissibility.
Unfortunately, party autonomy is nowhere considered by the Court of Appeal in Dominion.
32 Instead, the Court rendered inoperative the parties' choice of standard based on a rule developed in the administrative law context. As explained in the following section, that transposition is inapposite. The Court's failure to consider party autonomy is unsurprising since that principle, so fundamental to arbitration, plays no real role in administrative law. Parties to administrative proceedings do not select the process or decision-maker; these are imposed. That distinction forms part of the justification for treating party agreement on the standard of review differently in arbitration.
B. Misplaced reliance on administrative law principles
In relying on administrative law principles to negate the parties' standard of review selection, the Court of Appeal's decisions in Dominion comport two flaws. First, and unlike in administrative law, party agreement on what would normally constitute a purely legal matter is permissible in arbitration because of the inherent flexibility generated by the party autonomy principle (a). Second, the Court seems to misapprehend the doctrinal basis for deference to arbitrators, which is, once again, party autonomy. It instead refers to the presumptive reasonableness on "home statute" interpretation applicable in administrative law, which is wholly inapplicable to arbitral tribunals (b).
a. Party agreement permissible on matters of law
The Court in Dominion did not feel bound by the parties' standard of review agreement, labeling it "not determinative".
33 This is true in the administrative law context, from which the case law adopting that principle originates.
34 The arbitration context is materially different, however. As a preliminary matter, this statement, drawn from a 2004 Supreme Court decision, though still correct in its context (i.e. that courts must assess the standard of review for themselves) has not aged well, and has become somewhat overbroad in light of that Court's subsequent jurisprudence.
35
Reasonableness now reigns as the presumptive standard on questions of law arising out of an administrative decision-maker's home statute or a closely connected one.
36 In administrative law, one can no longer say the courts must always assure the law is applied correctly.
The same can be said for arbitration law. In Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp, the Supreme Court largely (though not entirely) imported the Dunsmuir administrative standard of review framework-together with the presumptive reasonableness developed in the post-Dunsmuir expansion and fortification of deferential review-into arbitration:
[106] …In the context of commercial arbitration, where appeals are restricted to questions of law, the standard of review will be reasonableness unless the question is one that would attract the correctness standard, such as constitutional questions or questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator's expertise (internal citation omitted).
37
The Court of Appeal in Dominion did not reference Sattva, which remains the precedent case addressing the standard of review for appeals on questions of law from domestic commercial arbitral awards.
38 Perhaps the Court failed to cite Sattva since the case at bar dealt with statutory rather than contractual arbitration.
However, Sattva is not limited to contractual arbitration; the standard of review framework in that case applies generally to appeals on questions of law under the various provincial domestic arbitration statutes.
39
The Supreme Court in Teal Cedar itself applied Sattva to a statutory arbitration under British Columbia's Forestry Revitalization Act. 40 Had the Dominion Court considered Justice Rothstein's reasoning in Sattva, it might have recognized that deference to arbitrators is founded on the very same agreement and consent it refused to honour in this case.
Furthermore, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the scheme of the Act appears to support the parties' freedom to agree on the standard of review. The section 45 appeal provision does not figure among those the parties cannot vary or exclude.
41 If the parties are free to vary or exclude section 45's application, it is unclear why stipulating the standard of review 37 Sattva,  would not simply amount to an articulation of that right. The Sattva framework applies only to appeals, not applications to set aside awards under section 46 of the Act (and its counterparts). Accordingly, the only provision in the Act that the Sattva framework covers is one the parties are free to vary. The Court of Appeal's analysis does not give due consideration to the parties' freedom to modify or outright exclude the appeal process. In so doing, the Court started on the wrong doctrinal footing, which led it directly to an administrative law analysis. The decision in Dominion further neglects the fact that arbitral justice, as a dispute resolution system, runs parallel to the public justice system. 42 Not only do the parties control what law applies, they control whether any defined law applies. Although section 31 of the Act states the tribunal shall decide the dispute "in accordance with law, including equity", parties are free to contract out of that provision. They may instead choose to empower the tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono (according to its conscience). 43 Assuming the parties want law to apply, they may select Ontario law, foreign law or even a private code or set of non-binding legal rules, such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 44 Parties can theoretically invent their own, unique set of rules for resolving disputes arising between them. Take a stark illustration: the parties may agree to have their dispute arbitrated under Ontario law as it existed on (for example) January 1, 1992, but with certain substantive alterations of the parties' own making. To tell a court to apply a morphed version of the law from a previous point in time is ludicrous, yet nothing prevents parties from arbitrating a dispute on that basis.
This flexibility in selecting legal rules is a feature of party autonomy. If the parties are free to select whether any and, if so, which legal rules, apply, and if they may even go as far as altering an existing body of law, it seems strange to draw the line at the standard of review. Finally, on this point, one of the reasons the court must decide the standard of review in the administrative law context is that the jurisprudence becomes binding. In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court teaches that the first step in ascertaining the applicable standard of review is determining whether the jurisprudence settles the matter. 45 If a Court were to set the standard of review based on the parties' agreement, that agreement could ultimately bind future litigants.
46
In contrast, by giving effect to the parties' choice in an arbitration agreement to have legal determinations reviewed for correctness, the court does not pronounce itself on the standard of review applicable to the discrete legal point in issue. There is no threat of the parties' chosen standard of review binding future courts since the determination is necessarily fact-specific-the fact that a contract between "A" and "B" contains a review clause calling for correctness on questions of law has no binding effect on future disputants. The reviewing court must examine the agreement between the parties in each case to determine whether they agreed on the standard of review in advance, or whether the default regime in Sattva applies. When there is not specific agreement, the arbitral standard of review is already set per Sattva.
In administrative law, the standard may differ depending on various factors, including the particular decision-maker, the nature of the issue, and whether the decision-maker is interpreting its home statute or a closely related statute. Not so in arbitral review where, subject to the two lingering correctness categories imported from the administrative law framework (constitutional questions and questions of central importance to the legal system outside the decision-maker's expertise), the arbitral standard of review is invariably reasonableness, unless of course the parties expressly agree otherwise. Put differently, the arbitral standard of review framework does not require the versatility to deal with the myriad of administrative decision-makers, from quasi-judicial tribunals, to front-line adjudicators, to ministers. The same default standard of review framework set out in Sattva applies to all domestic arbitral tribunals, regardless of the subjectmatter, importance of the issue to the parties, or any other contextual factor habitually applied to determine the standard of review in administrative law. There are accordingly no jurisprudential consequences to allowing agreement on the standard of review in the arbitration context. The standard of review framework can be summed up simply as "reasonableness by default and correctness by agreement".
b. Misapprehended justification for deference to arbitral tribunals
The rationale for deference to arbitrators on questions of law is predicated on party autonomy itself. Justice Rothstein explained in Sattva 45 Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 62 (this has arguably been tempered in the post-Alberta
Teachers/Edmonton East world given the push towards overriding presumptive reasonableness, but the statement still stands since, as of this writing, Dunsmuir has not officially been overturned). 46 One might argue that a case applying an agreed upon standard of review would not have precedential value. That may be, assuming the reasons makes obvious that the judge gave effect to the parties' agreement on the standard of review. Depending on the judge and drafting style, that may or may not be the case. that an arbitrator's expertise is presumed, based on the parties' having chosen that particular person to adjudicate. 47 But when those same parties also decide that the person they selected should not enjoy deference on certain sorts of issues, it follows that the deemed expertise is curtailed. One could conceive of practical reasons why parties might wish to have an arbitrator's legal conclusions reviewed for correctness. For example, consider a highly technical dispute where the parties appoint a non-lawyer ("lay") arbitrator with substantial knowledge in the relevant field. In that case, the parties selected the arbitrator for his or her technical expertise, not legal acumen. Those parties might be quite content for the reviewing court to defer on factual matters, but prefer that a more discerning eye be applied to legal issues should they arise. If that is their will, there appears to be no statutory or principled reason for denying that procedural variant. On the contrary, the Act's framework supports it. Note that absent agreement to the contrary, it is appropriate to presumptively apply reasonableness on questions of law, regardless of what the arbitrator's actual skills are. As Justice Rothstein said in Sattva: "where parties choose their own decisionmaker, it may be presumed that such decision-makers are chosen either based on their expertise in the area which is the subject of dispute or are otherwise qualified in a manner that is acceptable to the parties." 48 Thus, the only basis for rebutting the presumption would be an express agreement on a non-deferential standard of review. After all, if reasonableness is based on implied confidence in arbitral expertise, an express term calling for correctness not only overrides the presumption as a technical matter, it altogether eliminates the rationale for the presumption in the first place. In other words, if the arbitration agreement-the sole source from which an arbitrator derives deemed expertise justifying curial deference-indicates that the parties want non-deferential review notwithstanding having chosen the individual arbitrator(s), any justification for deference falls away. Without an express agreement, however, the deference presumption should remain irrebuttable.
49
The reliance in Dominion upon the "home statute presumption" to justify deference to arbitral tribunals deciding SABS priority disputes is also misplaced. Such an approach ignores salient differences between public administrative justice and private arbitral justice. The Insurance Act is not the arbitral tribunal's home statute. Arbitral tribunals do not have home statutes. Their "enabling act" is not the public act of the legislature, but the private act of two or more parties exercising their civil rights to submit a dispute to arbitration. Paradoxically, the Ontario Court of Appeal has itself 47 Sattva,  expertise does not derive from statute, there is no reason why the statute itself should alter the parties' ability to sculpt the arbitral process, unless of course it contains provisions expressly constraining that ability. Those provisions would have to be express since party autonomy is the rule, and restriction the exception. In that regard, it is important to recall there is no "default" procedure for arbitration, except, perhaps, in the most general sense, a private adjudication that is adversarial in nature. Although counsel sometimes simply conduct arbitration under their home court rules, expressly or impliedly (the Author has witnessed firsthand examples of both), that is not the default. As always, the parties are still operating under an express or tacit agreement to proceed in a certain way. It would thus be improper to limit the parties' choice in crafting their dispute resolution process absent some affirmative, statutory reason for doing so. The purported distinction between statutory and contractual arbitration is therefore illusory inasmuch as the statute requiring resolution by arbitration does not also set further parameters. The provision at issue in Dominion, for example, simply says that the dispute must go to arbitration in accordance with the Act, but does not set any further rules or constraints. Note that the Insurance Act expressly incorporates the Act by reference. There should therefore be no doubt that parties to an arbitration provided for in the Insurance Act ought to enjoy the same rights as other disputants who submit to arbitration under the Act. In any event, the Act automatically applies to arbitration under other statutes unless excluded, so the legislature need not expressly incorporate the Act into a statute for the parties to enjoy the normal adaptability arbitration provides. 54 In light of this, and on the assumption that parties may select a standard of review in a commercial arbitration under the Act, there is no reason parties to an arbitration provided for by statute (and falling under the Act) should not enjoy the same freedom.
IV. Conclusion
The rules of the game in arbitration always begin, and often end, with the parties' agreement. Subject to the narrow bases for court interference and mandatory provisions in the lex arbitri (in this case the Act), arbitration law and policy in Canada has been decidedly respectful toward party autonomy, and has likewise recognized arbitration as a private dispute resolution system running largely in parallel with the public legal system. The parties' choice to pre-select the standard of review applicable to appeals from arbitral awards is not one of the areas in which a pressing public policy consideration demands encroachment on private party choice.
Administrative law rules and doctrines are sometimes helpfully adopted in the arbitral context. But they are not always applicable. Canadian 54 Arbitration Act, supra note 1 at s 2(3).
courts have, at times, had difficulty assessing where administrative law principles cease to apply to arbitration. In the Author's view, and as expressed elsewhere, the review framework cast in Sattva is imperfect due to overreliance on administrative law principles to the detriment of party autonomy. Misadventures like those that occurred in Dominion and Intact are avoidable. When faced with an opportunity to apply administrative law rules in the arbitration context, the court should take a step back and first examine whether the rule is consonant with party autonomy and the consentbased nature of arbitration. If not, a tailor-made solution for arbitration (or adoption of an existing solution applied in international arbitration) might prove necessary.
55
55 Courts should look to international arbitration authorities for inspiration. However, the same caution about overreliance on administrative law principles applies to overreliance on international arbitration authority in the domestic context since not every single rule, doctrine or practice translates cleanly.
